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907 
Book Review  
Using the Religion Clauses to Secure  
Religious Liberty 
Securing Religious Liberty: Principles for Judicial 
Interpretation of the Religion Clauses 
by Jesse Choper 
University of Chicago Press (1995) 
  
 When the greatest laws are being undermined by bad hu-
man beings, who is a more appropriate defender [of the gods’ ex-
istence] than the lawgiver?1 
 
 When the religion of a people is destroyed, doubt gets hold of 
the higher powers of the intellect and half paralyzes all the oth-
ers. Every man[’s] . . . opinions are ill-defended and easily 
abandoned; and, in despair of ever solving by himself the hard 
problems respecting the destiny of man, he ignobly submits to 
think no more about them. 
Such a condition cannot but enervate the soul, relax the 
springs of the will, and prepare a people for servitude. Not only 
does it happen in such a case that they allow their freedom to be 
taken away from them; they frequently surrender it them-
selves. . . . As everything is at sea in the sphere of the mind, they 
determine at least that the mechanism of society shall be firm 
and fixed; and as they cannot resume their ancient belief, they 
assume a master.2 
 
 
 
 1. PLATO, THE LAWS OF PLATO 288 (Thomas L. Pangle trans., Basic Books, Inc. 
1980). 
 2. 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 21-22 (Phillips Bradley 
ed., Henry Reeve trans., Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1972) (1840). 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
People today sometimes assume that the Religion Clauses 
the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses3 (the “Religion 
Clauses”) are a wall protecting the state from religious influ-
ences4 but such was not always the case. Many Founders who 
voted for the Bill of Rights were deeply religious, and they de-
manded the adoption of the Religion Clauses in order to protect 
their religious liberty.5 Accordingly, the Religion Clauses were 
not neutral on the subject of religious liberty, nor were they in-
cluded in the Constitution to protect the state from religion; 
they were included to protect “each from the other, in the ser-
vice of the larger goal of preserving religious liberty.”6 
Jesse Choper’s book, Securing Religious Liberty: Principles 
for Judicial Interpretation of the Religion Clauses, focuses on 
producing coherent principles for adjudicating the Religion 
Clauses.7 In Choper’s view, the two Religion Clauses form a 
complimentary fortress for religious liberty, and to ignore ei-
ther is to expose that liberty to the damaging forces of govern-
ment.8 In providing substance to this fortress, Choper does not 
attempt to follow every Supreme Court opinion on the subject. 
Rather, as the title suggests, Choper has one set goal: securing 
religious liberty.9 
Although the goal of securing religious liberty might not 
seem controversial at first glance, the potential results pro-
duced by Choper’s efforts at securing religious liberty are con-
troversial. As Choper admits, “I know of no one—including 
me—who does not disagree with some, if not many, of the re-
sults my approach produces.”10 However, because I agree with 
 
 3. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment reads in pertinent part: “Con-
gress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof.” Id. 
 4. See Stephen L. Carter, The Resurrection of Religious Freedom?, 107 HARV. L. 
REV. 118, 133-34 (1993) (noting that some recent school prayer decisions might lead 
some to believe that the Religion Clauses are “designed to protect the ‘good’ part of 
life—the state—against the ‘bad’ part—the church”). 
 5. See Douglas Laycock, The Benefits of the Establishment Clause, 42 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 373, 374 (1992). 
 6. Carter, supra note 4, at 134. 
 7. See JESSE CHOPER, SECURING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: PRINCIPLES FOR JUDICIAL 
INTERPRETATION OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES 1 (1995). 
 8. See id. at 13-14. 
 9. See id. at 11. 
 10. Id. at 189. 
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Choper that a coherent and consistent application of the law 
that reduces judicial discretion is more desirable than absolute 
agreement with every result produced,11 a few disagreeable re-
sults do not dissuade me from commending his approach. Ac-
cordingly, this Review will not attempt to analyze the desirabil-
ity of every result reached by Choper, but it will analyze 
Choper’s internal consistency and effectiveness in producing a 
coherent set of principles that will secure religious liberty. 
Part II of this Review analyzes Choper’s principles for in-
terpretation of the Religion Clauses. Part III discusses Cho-
per’s definition of religious liberty and analyzes its effect on 
Choper’s principles. Part IV concludes that Choper’s approach 
is not entirely consistent in its foundation or its application, 
but that a modified form of Choper’s principles would effec-
tively protect religious liberty. 
II.  CHOPER’S PRINCIPLES 
Choper sets out four principles for courts to follow in inter-
preting the Religion Clauses—two principles for each clause. 
These principles attempt to yoke the Religion Clauses together 
in defending religious liberty.12 This section will analyze par-
ticular problems in the application and interpretation of these 
principles. 
A.  Principles for Applying the Free Exercise Clause 
1.  Deliberate disadvantage principle 
The deliberate disadvantage principle prevents government 
action rooted in prejudice for or against religious interests. 
This principle states, “Government Action that intentionally 
prejudices individuals because they have or do not have certain 
religious beliefs should be held to violate the Free Exercise 
Clause unless the government demonstrates that the regula-
tion is necessary to a compelling interest.”13 
The definition of “intentionally” poses two problems. First, 
a legislator’s reasons for voting affirmatively may differ from 
what the legislator hopes the law itself will accomplish. In ad-
 
 11. See id. at 1. 
 12. See id. at 35. 
 13. Id. at 41. 
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dressing this problem, Choper states that courts should only 
look into what the legislators hoped the law itself would ac-
complish, rather than the reasons the legislators may have 
voted for the bill.14 Choper justifies this view of intent by noting 
the difficulty of discerning the wide array of possible reasons 
that someone might vote for a bill, such as a favor to a fellow 
legislator.15 
Second, if Congress passes a bill, most likely the affirmative 
votes have been cast for a variety of reasons. Choper does not 
satisfactorily address this problem. He states only that a find-
ing of intent under the deliberate disadvantage principle will 
be rareseemingly, only when the intent is explicit or no other 
plausible explanation exists for the government action.16 Al-
though this answer sidesteps the real problem of determining 
governmental intent, the determination is problematic in all 
areas of the law; to place the burden of resolving it on any one 
commentator would be unfair. Because intent is essentially the 
only requirement of the intentional disadvantage principle, 
once intent is shown the principle is quite broad.17 This is 
rightly so, since a government action that was intended to dis-
advantage individuals based on their religious beliefs is likely 
to damage their religious liberty. 
2.  Burdensome effect principle 
The burdensome effect principle mandates exemptions from 
government regulations in some circumstances for those pos-
sessing religious beliefs that conflict with the actions required 
by the regulations. Choper states the principle as follows: 
If government regulations of conduct that are generally appli-
cable and enacted for secular/neutral purposes (i.e., without 
intent to provide an advantage to religious interests or preju-
dice individuals because of their beliefs) conflict with action or 
inaction pursuant to the tenets of a particular religion, the 
Free Exercise Clause should be held to require an exemption 
under the following circumstances: the claimant has suffered 
cognizable injury; the exemption does not violate the Estab-
lishment Clause; the exemption does not require the govern-
 
 14. See id. at 45. 
 15. See id. at 46. 
 16. See id. at 48. 
 17. See id. at 41. The government can attempt to “demonstrate[] that the regula-
tion is necessary to a compelling interest,” id., but this showing is extremely difficult. 
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ment to abandon its entire regulatory program; the individ-
ual’s beliefs are sincerely held; violation of those beliefs en-
tails extratemporal consequences; an alternative burden is 
imposed if one exists that does not conflict with the religious 
objector’s beliefs; and the government cannot demonstrate 
that denial of the exemption is necessary to a compelling in-
terest.18 
The circumstances requiring an exemption to a generally 
applicable regulation are narrow. However, this seems appro-
priate because regulations that intentionally disadvantage par-
ticular individuals are covered by the broader deliberate dis-
advantage principle.19 Broad regulatory exemptions would mo-
tivate individuals to avoid regulations by changing their pro-
claimed beliefs. Even disbelievers would proclaim religious be-
liefs because of this burden on their religious liberty. For the 
most part, the burdensome effect principle exemption require-
ments are sound. 
The requirements that there be cognizable injury to the in-
dividual, that the individual’s beliefs are sincerely held, and 
that violation of those beliefs would entail extratemporal con-
sequences are vital limitations on this principle. Cognizable in-
jury does not include an assertion that a particular individual 
is offended by the governmental regulations.20 Although this 
should already be a requirement for a party to have constitu-
tional standing,21 its inclusion in the principle should serve as a 
reminder of the importance of such an injury. 
The requirement that the individual’s beliefs are sincerely 
held should deter individuals from asserting religious beliefs 
for the sole purpose of evading governmental regulations. If the 
beliefs have been trumped up for purposes of avoidance, the 
lack of sincerity should be readily apparent to the finder of fact 
in many cases.22 The requirement that violation of those beliefs 
 
 18. Id. at 54. 
 19. See id. at 41. 
 20. See id. at 86. 
 21. See Campbell v. Louisiana, 523 U.S. 392, 405 (1998) (Thomas, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (stating that a “perception of unfairness” does not sat-
isfy the “injury in fact” requirement for constitutional standing). 
 22. However, as Choper points out, this requirement is far from perfect, and 
some cases will not be so clear. It is often difficult to separate what is sincerely believed 
by the individual from what seems believable to the finder of fact. See CHOPER, supra 
note 7, at 91. Choper suggests that special rules distributing the burden of proof on this 
issue may alleviate this problem to some extent. See id. at 91-92. 
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would entail extratemporal consequences seems, at first glance, 
to create an arbitrary distinction between different religious 
beliefs and even different religions. Choper includes this limi-
tation to distinguish between the differing amounts of anguish 
experienced by different individuals as a result of violating 
their religious beliefs.23 Choper claims that an individual will 
undergo more suffering as a result of violating a belief that has 
extratemporal consequences than one that does not.24 However, 
within a particular religious faith, the distinction between 
those choices that have extratemporal consequences and those 
that do not is often unclear even for those familiar with the re-
ligion. Moreover, this distinction may create an incentive for 
believers to create extratemporal consequences for their beliefs 
even though they would not otherwise do so. 
An example within the Judeo-Christian community is the 
commandment “honor thy father and thy mother: that thy days 
may be long upon the land which the Lord thy God giveth 
thee.”25 Literally interpreted, the violation of this command-
ment brings only a temporal consequence—a shortened life 
span. However, some Christians and Jews believe that every 
sin in this life, if not overcome by some type of cleansing proc-
ess, will produce extratemporal consequences. Others do not 
share these beliefs. To say the least, a judge who is not familiar 
with this religion will have difficulty sorting out these differ-
ences. Moreover, if a governmental regulation would require a 
particular Christian or Jew to dishonor her parents, then the 
burdensome effect principle would motivate that individual to 
change her religious beliefs by including extratemporal conse-
quences for violation of the commandment. However, the ex-
tratemporal consequences definition probably does not create 
any more incentive to change beliefs than would any other 
definition, nor would it confuse a judge more than alternatives 
such as “transcendent reality” or “ultimate concerns.”26 
Choper also requires the government to impose an alterna-
tive burden upon the individual if one can be found that will 
not violate the individual’s religious beliefs.27 For example, this 
requirement would demand that those who object to military 
 
 23. See id. at 75. 
 24. See id. 
 25. Exodus 20:12. 
 26. See CHOPER, supra note 7, at 69-74, 80-85. 
 27. See id. at 92-93. 
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service on religious grounds serve in other capacities.28 This re-
quirement alleviates much of the adverse incentive created by 
the extratemporal consequences requirement and the burden-
some effect principle in general. An individual will not have a 
great incentive to change her beliefs solely to fit within the 
burdensome effect principle if the resulting exemption will only 
bring her another equally burdensome requirement. 
B.  Principles for Applying the Establishment Clause 
1.  Intentional advantage principle 
The intentional advantage principle prohibits government 
actions or programs that intentionally give an advantage to in-
dividuals or groups because of their religious beliefs. The prin-
ciple states, 
Government programs that deliberately favor religious inter-
ests or government actions that relieve individuals because of 
their religious beliefs from the burdens of generally applicable 
regulations should be held to violate the Establishment 
Clause only if the programs or actions pose a significant 
threat to religious liberty or if they are discriminatory.29 
 The intentional advantage principle, on its face, seems con-
sistent with the goal of securing religious liberty because it 
prohibits actions or programs that favor religious interests. 
However, it only does so if there is a significant threat to reli-
gious liberty, including the situation of discriminatory actions  
or programs (those that treat similarly situated religions  
differently).30 
Choper’s application of this principle, however, seems in-
consistent with its text at times. For example, Choper con-
cludes that if a government declared “Christianity is our relig-
ion,” it would not violate the intentional advantage principle.31 
Yet, any law containing such an official statement would cer-
tainly be part of a government program that intentionally fa-
 
 28.  See id. at 92 (noting that Congress has already created such a requirement 
for military objectors). 
 29. Id. at 97. 
 30. See id. 
 31. See id. at 157. However, Choper asserts that if the government expended tax 
funds in support of this statement or required some sort of action by its citizens, then it 
would violate the principle. 
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vors religion, thus meeting the first prong of the intentional 
advantage principle. Moreover, the official statement treats 
Christianity differently than other similarly situated religions, 
making it discriminatory.32 It should thus be held to violate the 
intentional advantage principle. 
Nevertheless, under the intentional advantage principle, 
Choper would invalidate most forms of school release time for 
students to participate in forms of religious education.33 It 
seems obvious that such programs do intentionally favor reli-
gious interests. However, such programs typically are not dis-
criminatorystudents are allowed to attend classes from any 
religion that is willing to sponsor such classes. Choper argues 
that release time programs are a significant threat to religious 
liberty because they encourage students to attend religious 
meetings when they would otherwise not do so. Choper admits 
this encouragement would come, not from the governmental ac-
tion, but from the peer pressure by other students.34 Under 
Choper’s reasoning, the government actions would be held in-
valid because of the independent actions of the students. The 
religious influence can be causally traced back to the govern-
ment, but that influence depends on an intermediate independ-
ent actor. Because the threat to religious liberty is not a result 
of the government action, it should be held not to violate the in-
tentional advantage principle. 
2.  Independent impact principle 
The independent impact principle prohibits government ac-
tions that unintentionally benefit religions if those actions pro-
vide no secular benefits and endanger religious liberty. The 
principle states, “Even if its purpose is nonreligious and it has 
general applicability, government action that benefits religious 
interests and has no independent secular impact should be held 
to violate the Establishment Clause if the action poses a mean-
ingful danger to religious liberty.”35 
The most interesting situation analyzed by Choper under 
this principle is government aid to parochial schools. Choper 
 
 32. See id. at 112 (stating that the discrimination requirement is met if religions 
that are “similarly situated religiously” are treated differently by the government). 
 33. See id. at 140-45. 
 34. See id. 
 35. Id. at 160. 
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states that such aid poses a meaningful danger to religious lib-
erty only if the funds are used for religious purposes.36 How-
ever, determining whether the funds are used for religious 
purposes becomes sticky. Choper states that there is no mean-
ingful danger to religious liberty if the state receives full secu-
lar value for its money, regardless of whether religious inter-
ests are also furthered.37 Choper then suggests that courts 
determine which portions of a school’s funds go to secular as-
pects and which go to religious aspects.38 As a measuring stick 
for this determination, Choper suggests comparing the time 
spent on secular education within the parochial school to the 
time spent on education in public schools.39 
As Choper admits, this analysis creates problems in practi-
cal application. It is quite difficult to determine when time is 
being spent on religious education and when it is spent on secu-
lar education.40 However, Choper uses the public schools as a 
benchmark for this determination: “When a public school ac-
tion is found to be religious, the court must enjoin it; when a 
parochial school practice is held to be religious, the court must 
forbid its public subsidy.”41 Although this determination is 
sticky, it is no more so than determining whether an action is 
forbidden in public schools.42 
III. RELIGIOUS LIBERTY DEFINED 
A.  Group Religious Liberty 
Choper states that “the paramount concern of both Religion 
Clauses is to protect religious liberty—the freedom to pursue 
(or not to choose) a religious faith.”43 Throughout most of the 
 
 36. See id. at 176-77. 
 37. See id. at 177. 
 38. See id. at 181. 
 39. See id. at 182-83. 
 40. See id. at 182 (“This would involve courts in the unwelcome task of ‘separat-
ing the secular from the religious in education [which] is one of magnitude, intricacy 
and delicacy.’ ” (quoting McCullum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 237 (1948) (Jack-
son, J., concurring))). 
 41. Id. at 183. 
 42. See id. at 182-83. It is likely that the issue would arise more often in paro-
chial schools because they have a greater incentive to incorporate religion into their 
curriculum. Nevertheless, courts are adequately equipped to deal with the issue using 
precedents from public school decisions. 
 43. Id. at 11. 
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book, Choper limits the scope of protection to individual reli-
gious liberty.44 Although, as Choper asserts, it is almost uni-
versally agreed that the purpose of the Religion Clauses is to 
secure religious liberty,45 it is not agreed that the scope of the 
Religion Clauses should be limited to individual liberty. Sev-
eral commentators in recent years have argued that the reli-
gious liberty of groups, particularly religious groups, should 
also be protected by the Religion Clauses, and moreover, that 
where individual and group liberties clash, the liberty of the 
group should be favored.46 
If Choper’s overall definition of Religious Liberty were 
broadened in this way, many of his results would remain un-
changed.47 However, a few undesirable results reached by the 
principles could be changed. For example, Choper’s most shock-
ing result is that a government could officially pronounce 
“Christianity is our religion,” and if nothing more were done 
the pronouncement would not violate the Religion Clauses.48 
Presumably, this is true because the pronouncement alone 
would not be a significant threat to any individual’s religious 
liberty.49 However, such a pronouncement would likely create a 
significant threat to the religious liberty of a competing reli-
gious group.50 It is quite possible that such a pronouncement 
would deplete the membership of competing religious groups 
and motivate them to conform their beliefs with Christian 
groups. 
Frederick Gedicks and others assert that recognition of 
group religious liberty would strengthen individual religious 
 
 44. See generally id. 
 45. See id. at 11-12. 
 46. See, e.g., Frederick Mark Gedicks, Toward a Constitutional Jurisprudence of 
Religious Group Rights, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 99. 
 47. For example, Choper states that employment discrimination by religious 
groups based on tenets of faith should be allowed under the consent principle. See 
CHOPER, supra note 7, at 133-40. Broadening the definition of religious liberty to in-
clude groups would only serve to strengthen this position. 
 48. See id. at 157-58. 
 49. Although I believe such a statement is discriminatory and should thus violate 
the intentional advantage principle, see supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text, for 
purposes of this discussion I will assume it is not discriminatory so that it will only vio-
late the principle if it poses a significant threat to religious liberty. 
 50. It is also possible, if the pronouncement had an influential effect on individu-
als in deciding which, if any, religion to join, that it would create a threat to their reli-
gious liberty. Choper does not discuss this argument in his book, presumably because 
the threat is too tenuous. 
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liberty, which is threatened by the increasingly-powerful mod-
ern government.51 Gedicks asserts that the founders could not 
have envisioned the power of the modern government and thus 
that they could not have envisioned the safeguards necessary 
to guard our individual liberty against the modern govern-
ment.52 Furthermore, Gedicks claims that religious groups pro-
tect individual liberty by challenging the power of the state,53 
and that they need the freedom to define themselves as a group 
and to represent their members.54 In fact, the importance of 
these goups is so great that the liberty of the group should ac-
tually trump the liberty of the individual if the two conflict.55 
An alternative to Gedicks’s utilitarian argument lies in 
tacit consent theory, which is often used as a justification for 
the rule of law. This theory, first explicated in Plato’s Crito, 
posits that if the individual voluntarily lives within a society 
ruled by laws and benefits from those laws, that individual has 
also consented to be ruled by those laws.56 In so doing, the indi-
viduals consent to give up that portion of their rights and pow-
ers necessary for the proper functioning of the laws. Thus, the 
laws gain their power, authority, and rights from the tacit con-
sent of the individuals living under them. In the same way, a 
group can be said to gain power, authority, and rights from the 
tacit consent of its members. Surely within a religious group 
this tacit consent would include that portion of the individual’s 
right to religious liberty that is necessary for the proper func-
tioning of the group. Although this theory confers rights upon 
groups, it does not fully answer the question of whether the re-
tained rights of the individual or the conferred rights of the 
group should prevail when they conflict. 
In answer to this conflict, Choper asserts that the individ-
 
 51. See Gedicks, supra note 46, at 169. 
 52. See id. 
 53. See id. at 99. 
 54. See id. passim. 
 55. See id. at 159-68 (recommending a categorical right of groups to define them-
selves by imposing definitional choices on their members). 
 56. See Plato, Crito, in FOUR TEXTS ON SOCRATES 99, 110-11 (Thomas G. West & 
Grace Starry West trans., 1984). In Crito, Socrates is waiting in prison to be executed 
when Crito comes to break him out and have him flee from the land. See id. at 101. 
However, Socrates refuses because he has made a binding agreement with the laws to 
obey them. This agreement was made because Socrates voluntarily remained in the 
land ruled by those laws—in essence he tacitly consented to be bound by them. See id. 
at 110-11. 
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ual has surrendered a portion of her religious liberty rights to 
the religious group, and not having retained that portion, can-
not assert it against that group.57 This result is consistent with 
tacit consent theory because, if an individual tacitly consents to 
confer a right upon the group, it is inconsistent to later allow 
that individual, after reaping the benefits of group member-
ship, to reclaim those rights and assert them against the group. 
For example, in Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints fired a building 
engineer because he had not maintained church membership in 
good standing.58 This action by the church would have violated 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, but the church fell within a 
statutory exemption for religious organizations.59 The issue in 
that case was whether the statutory exemption violated the Es-
tablishment Clause.60 Under tacit consent theory, even if the 
exemption otherwise violated the Establishment Clause, Amos 
would not have been able to assert his religious liberty rights 
against the church because he had previously consented to the 
rules of the church by becoming and remaining a member. 
This tacit consent theory, when combined with Choper’s 
consent theory, yields similar results to Gedicks’s utilitarian 
argument in situations, such as in Amos, where the religious 
liberty of a group and one of its members comes into conflict. 
But what of the situation where a government pronounces 
“Christianity is our religion”? It seems that a group could as-
sert a concrete harm to its religious liberty rights, which have 
been conferred upon it by the tacit consent of the group’s mem-
bers, as discussed above. Moreover, it does not even seem likely 
that the religious liberty of the group would conflict with the 
liberty of its members in such a situation. Thus, a competing 
religion could have the government enjoined from making such 
a proclamation. 
 
 
 57. See CHOPER, supra note 7, at 137. 
 58. 483 U.S. 327, 330 (1987). 
 59. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (1994). 
 60. See Amos, 483 U.S. 327 passim. The Supreme Court held the exemption did 
not violate the Establishment Clause under the Lemon test. See id. at 339-40. 
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B.  Defining “Religion” 
Another problem with Choper’s definition of religious lib-
erty is his inconsistent definition of “religion.” Under the bur-
densome effect principle Choper defines religion as beliefs the 
violation of which have extratemporal consequences.61 Choper 
asserts that this narrow definition of religion is necessary in 
this context because of the danger of people adopting religious 
beliefs for the sole purpose of fitting within an exemption to a 
government regulation.62 However, under the intentional ad-
vantage principle, religion is defined with reference to the 
speech and association provisions of the First Amendment to 
include, not only beliefs with extratemporal consequences, but 
all “narrow partison ideoligies.”63 Choper argues that a less in-
clusive definition would allow government to favor religious 
ideologies over nonreligious ideologies.64 Although these differ-
ing definitions of religion may serve to produce results consid-
ered by Choper to be desirable, we must ask ourselves: What is 
the religious liberty that Choper is so adamantly defending? Is 
it only the freedom to choose or refrain from choosing a set of 
beliefs having extratemporal consequences, or is it the freedom 
to choose or refrain from choosing any set of “narrow partison 
ideologies?” 
Choper claims to produce an analytically consistent thesis, 
but this inconsistency in defining religion divides the very 
foundation of Choper’s thesis, which is aimed at protecting re-
ligious liberty. A consistent thesis should choose a definition for 
religious liberty and should protect it using both Religion 
Clauses, and each of the principles set forth.65 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
I agree with the text of Choper’s principles; I also agree that 
if courts applied these principles, jurisprudence under the Re-
ligion Clauses would vastly improve. However, I disagree with 
 
 61. See CHOPER, supra note 7, at 86. 
 62. See id. at 64 (stating that the role of the burdensome effect principle should 
be precisely restricted and that the chosen definition in this context should only be 
used under the burdensome effect principle). 
 63. Id. at 108, 116. 
 64. See id. 
 65. Defining religious liberty is a complex task, requiring extensive analysis. 
Such analysis is beyond the scope of this Review. Accordingly, this Review asserts only 
that the definition should be consistent. 
GOF-FIN.DOC 4/10/00  1:13 PM 
920 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1999 
some of Choper’s application of the principles, mainly because 
of internal inconsistencies. Foremost among those inconsisten-
cies is the definition of religion. To refuse to consistently define 
religion is to strip religious liberty of meaning and to deny force 
to those principles that would protect it. 
For the most part, the book’s principles are analytically 
consistent and are an effective protection for religious liberty. 
However, any consistent set of principles used to adjudicate the 
Religion Clauses will sometimes produce disagreeable results. 
If this is the price of certainty in constitutional jurisprudence, 
then so be it. A slightly modified interpretation of Choper’s 
principles will better protect religion and government from 
each other, thereby protecting religious liberty so that “the 
greatest laws” will not be “undermined by bad human beings,”66 
as Plato, de Tocqueville, and many of the Founders feared. 
Jared Goff 
 
 66. PLATO, supra note 1, at 288. 
